Good faith in the reform of insurance law by Birds, John
Good faith in the reform of insurance law” – thereis perhaps an element of ambiguity in the title.This is not simply because I want to reserve some
flexibility, but is a deliberate choice – I want to consider
the process of insurance law reform and add my voice to
the calls for the authorities to show good faith in examining
the need for the reform of aspects of insurance law.
Obviously I also want to look at some more substantive
questions surrounding the concept of good faith in
insurance law, but I think that my chosen title allows me to
range rather further afield.
PROCESS
Anyone with even the least interest in or knowledge of
insurance contract law knows that the strict doctrinal law
has long been regarded as capable of operating unfairly,
particularly towards the insured or policyholder. I would
hasten to add that this is not of course the same thing as
saying that it does always so operate. I fully accept that
insurers often pay claims when strictly they are not obliged
to. It would often be bad business and uneconomic for
them to enquire too closely. They also do not always have
it too easy. The internet provides us with a rich source of
examples of some of the statements that they can be faced
with. Some examples I recently found (at http://
www.carinsurances.co.uk/advice/humorous-quotes.html)
are:
“The car in front hit the pedestrian but he got up so I hit
him again”
“I saw a slow moving, sad faced old gentleman as he bounced
off the roof of my car.”
“I knew the dog was possessive about the car but I would not
have asked her to drive it if I had thought there was any
risk.”
“I pulled away from the side of the road, glanced at my
mother in law and headed over the embankment.”
“My car was legally parked as it backed into the other
vehicle.”
Notwithstanding this, and despite recent developments
that clearly have affected the operation of insurance law
doctrines to some extent, the basic doctrinal law of
insurance clearly recognises that the insured can act
honestly or in good faith and yet be penalised by
application of the doctrine of utmost good faith. Among
the wealth of modern authorities concerning good faith or
utmost good faith in insurance law, one unfortunately
rarely finds cited what I still regard as the very apt words of
McNair J in Roselodge v Castle ([1966] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 113)
in 1966. Having referred in particular to the classic
judgment of Lord Mansfield in Carter v Boehm ((1766) 3
Burr 1905), he continued:
“This concentration upon good faith being the basis of the
duty to disclose …if followed to its logical conclusion might
appear to lead to the result that if the proposed insured, if he
knows the fact, does not know that he ought to disclose, he
should be acquitted of a breach of good faith; but it has long
been established that if a material fact is known to the
proposer, he must disclose it whether he thought it to be
material or not.” ([1966] Lloyd’s Rep 113 at 129)
This surely must remain a matter for concern. Judges as
well as law reform bodies have voiced the criticisms across
the common law world and they go back many years. Any
footnote listing the cases and extra-judicial writings where
criticisms can be found would be a very lengthy one.
Judicial criticisms were first picked up officially in this
country by the Law Reform Committee in 1957 (Fifth
Report, Cmnd 62), who made what now look like fairly
modest recommendations, but they came to nought,
resisted it is thought by the power of the insurance
industry which stressed, as they have often done since, that
they relied on their strict legal rights only if they suspected
fraud. 3
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Twenty years later we had the more substantial project
undertaken by the Law Commission. Those with long
memories will recall that the impetus for the reference to
the Commission was the prospect of an EC Directive
seeking to harmonise core aspects of insurance contract
law alongside the moves for freedom of establishment and
freedom of services across the European Community. The
Government needed an examination of how the principles
applicable in many civil law systems could be reconciled
with the way that the common law approached the
question of assessing and monitoring the risk. Obviously
the then state of UK law had to be examined.
The Law Commission Report of 1980 (Report No 104,
Insurance Law: Non-Disclosure and Breach of Warranty, Cmnd
8064) remains the most detailed critique in this country of
the duty to disclose material facts and the effect of
insurance warranties, but there are a fair number of aspects
of insurance law that it does not examine. It was never
implemented properly, of course. Why? Probably because
the Law Commission wanted the law changed across the
insurance world and therefore particularly to standard
commercial policies, with the exception of marine,
transport and aviation insurance. The insurance industry
was not prepared to countenance that. Discussions that
followed the report sought to limit its effect to consumer
insurances, but defining those in what was regarded as an
entirely satisfactory manner was difficult. In the end the
Government (of a different political persuasion than the
one that had commissioned the report) agreed to what
some would say was a cop out – namely the amendment of
the Statements of Insurance Practice. By then, any
question of the European Community seeking to deal with
insurance contract law in the way previously envisaged had
disappeared. I shall return later to some issues on this.
Although since then there have been no further official –
in the sense of Government or Government-sponsored
work – looks at insurance law reform in this country, the
issue does not go away. One wonders, parenthetically,
whether the Department of Trade and Industry and more
recently the Treasury, has actually monitored the operation
of the Statements of Practice as it was promised they would
when eventually the Government announced that it would
not legislate on the Law Commission recommendations.
Recent years have seen the production of the National
Consumer Council Report, Insurance Law Reform, and more
recently the British Insurance Law Association has
produced its own call for reform just over a year ago
(Insurance Contract Law Reform: Recommendations to the Law
Commission, a Report of the Sub-Committee, September 2002).
Lawyers far more distinguished than I, especially
experienced senior members of the judiciary, notably
Lords Justices Rix and Longmore, continue to call for
reform, and their calls do not seem to me to be limited to
consumer insurances (in the case of Rix LJ, his views have
not just been expressed extra-judicially; see his judgment
in Drake Insurance plc v Provident Insurance plc [2003] EWCA
1834). Their lectures are appended to the BILA Report.
There seems to be a real prospect now of the Law
Commission looking at the question again; certainly they
appear to be trying hard to persuade the Treasury to allow
them to undertake at least a scoping study (to this end, a
seminar was held at the Law Commission on 29 January
2004). I want to make some suggestions as to their possible
agenda, but first I think that it is useful to note how the
insurance scene is rather different from that of 25 years ago
when the Law Commission last looked.
DIFFERENCES IN THE LAST 25 YEARS
What then are some of the differences in the insurance
industry, insurance practice and indeed the operation of
insurance law in the last quarter century?
First there is a rather different shape to the industry
itself as a result of a large number of mergers and
takeovers. Many of the household names of the last 200
years no longer exist. I do not claim that this is necessarily
a significant point as regards law reform, but it is
nonetheless a fact. Secondly, there seems to be a much
greater volume of litigation or at least reported litigation,
with the commercial disputes seeming normally to involve
reinsurance. When I first studied insurance law, and indeed
wrote the first edition of my book, there were probably on
average two or three significant reported insurance cases
every two or three years. Now they fill a specialised series
and each year seems to contain a fair number of significant
decisions.
The third difference is that there seems to be some
evidence that freedom of services and establishment within
the European Union is working to some extent and that
there is increased cross-border contracting within the EU.
It is certainly the case that, for example, British
policyholders will effect insurance that is not just
applicable within Britain. Think of the very many who take
their cars to Europe each year insured under a policy
issued in the United Kingdom.
Fourthly, and perhaps more importantly, we have
experienced 20 years of the Insurance Ombudsman
applying an increasingly consumer-orientated approach to
insurance disputes and undoubtedly modifying insurance
practice and the application of standard legal doctrines.
The Law Commission in 1980 told us that proportionality
as a modified remedy for non-disclosure would not work,
but the Ombudsman has in effect made it work. Now of
course the Financial Ombudsman Service has taken over
the work of the Insurance Ombudsman Bureau. While
there is no doubt that the FOS has continued the sterling
work of the IOB, there is a fear that the pressure of work
on that service, wherein insurance disputes are only a
fraction of those it has to deal with, may lead to an
approach that is less focused on individual disputes.4
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We must also prepare for the fairly imminent prospect
of the Financial Services Authority regulating the selling of
general insurance and incorporating the Statements of
Practice into its rules, thus moving them beyond the
boundaries of “soft law”. If nothing else, this must call into
question the extent to which those statements need further
examination to assess their applicability today. A fifth
difference from 25 years ago has been the move to plain
English in the drafting of proposal forms and policies.
There can be no doubt that consumer policies, and some
commercial policies, are much easier for the lay person to
read and understand. A sixth difference is that other
jurisdictions, especially Australia, have enacted substantial
reform with an increasing experience that we can draw on.
My final difference and perhaps the most important one
is to remind you of the substantial development that there
has been in the doctrinal law, and I will spend just a few
minutes outlining some of these developments.
LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS
As regards the areas of law that the Law Commission
looked at, i.e. non-disclosure and breach of warranty, there
have of course been some key developments. We have had
clarification of the core duty of disclosure, especially in Pan
Atlantic v Pine Top and subsequent case law (apart from Pan
Atlantic Insurance Co v Pine Top Insurance Co [1995] 1 AC 501,
the list includes St Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co (UK) Ltd v
McDonnell Dowell Constructors Ltd [1995] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 116,
Marc Rich & Co AG v Portman [1997] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 225, ICCI
v The Royal Hotel Ltd [1998] Lloyd’s Rep IR 151 and
Assicurazioni Generali SpA v Arab Insurance Group [2002]
EWCA Civ 1642, [2003] Lloyd’s Rep IR 131) – importing
an inducement requirement that did not really occur to the
Commission. Of course their Lordships admitted that they
were reforming the law. Even before that we had in Bank of
Nova Scotia v Hellenic Mutual War Risk Association (Bermuda)
Ltd, The Good Luck [1992] 1 AC 233 clarification of the
effect of a breach of warranty in a manner that would
require the re-examination of some critical
recommendations of the Commission.
There has been important case law examining how,
among other things, the basic principles of utmost good
faith and disclosure apply to the common situations of co-
insurance (especially New Hampshire Insurance Co v MGN Ltd
[1997] LRLR 24 and Arab Bank plc v Zurich Insurance Co
[1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 262), and of course in the famous
“gem stones” litigation what was ultimately a fairly
ineffectual imposition of the duty of utmost good faith and
disclosure on the insurer (Banque Financiere de la Cite v
Westgate Insurance Co Ltd [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 69 (first
instance), [1990] 1 QB 665, (Court of Appeal), [1991] 2
AC 249 (House of Lords)). However, if the views of Rix LJ
and the other judges in the recent decision in Drake
Insurance plc v Provident Insurance plc [2003] EWCA Civ 1834
are right, then the insurer’s duty of utmost good faith can
act to limit the remedy of avoidance. It is respectfully
submitted, however, that the contrary views of the same
court, but differently constituted, in Brotherton v Aseguradora
Colseguros SA (No 2) [2003] EWCA Civ 705, [2003] Lloyd’s
Rep IR 746 are to be preferred as a matter of current law.
It is notable that in Drake, the judges did not refer to this
aspect of the decision in Brotherton.
We have also witnessed the introduction of some
statutory protection of the insurance consumer, by virtue
of the Regulations implementing the Unfair Terms
Directive (SI 1999 No 2083). These may or may not apply
to insurance warranties, but they clearly do apply to some
terms in insurance contracts, and we should not forget that
the original reference to the Law Commission asked it to
examine terms and conditions other than warranties. In
this context we have also had judicial recognition that the
concept of the innominate term can apply in insurance
contract law (Alfred McAlpine plc v BAI (Run-Off) Ltd [2000]
Lloyd’s Rep IR 352).
Perhaps the most important development has been the
question of whether there is a continuing duty of good faith
or utmost good faith in an insurance contract or at the very
least what that means (See especially Black King Shipping
Corp v Massie (The Litsion Pride) [1985] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 437,
Manifest Shipping & Co Ltd v Uni-Polaris Insurance Co Ltd (The
Star Sea) [2001] UKHL/1, [2001] 2 WLR 170, K/S Merc-
Scandia XXXXII v Lloyd’s Underwriters (The Mercandian
Continent) [2001] EWCA Civ 1275 [2001] 2 Lloyd’s Rep
563 and Agapitos v Agnew (The Aegeon) [2002] EWCA Civ
247, [2002] 3 WLR 616, [2002] Lloyd’s Rep IR 573).
Again we would do well to remember that the decision in
which that issue first properly appeared – The Litsion Pride
– arose after the Law Commission Report.
All this must mean that the task of the Law Commission,
if it is asked to look at insurance law again, is rather more
complex than it was 25 years ago. I will shortly proceed to
examine some of the issues that I suggest could be usefully
and properly examined by the Commission, but first there
is an important matter to return to in more detail, which
is the proper meaning of good faith in the insurance
context.
GOOD FAITH IN INSURANCE
What do we mean by good faith in insurance? A number
of judges and commentators have talked of good faith in a
manner that is, with due respect, somewhat confusing. For
example, even members of the House of Lords in their
speeches in The Star Sea used “good faith” rather than
“utmost good faith”, despite the fact the latter is what
appears in section 17 of the Marine Insurance Act. Surely
they are different. One can argue that “utmost” is a curious
word to use in this context, and I accept that we could
describe the phenomenon differently – perhaps by
referring to legal good faith, but the concept is surely clear.
In my respectful view, which I would not dream of
claiming to be unique, utmost good faith is concerned with 5
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questions of disclosure of information, and a failure to
disclose leads potentially at least to a severe sanction
available to the other party, because the basis of the
agreement between the parties is sufficiently different from
what they thought it was. Good faith is arguably a much
broader concept, but with a less severe sanction, that is
likely to limit the ability to exercise contractual rights.
Some distinguished judges and academics think that our
general contract law contains, like civil law systems
generally do, a general obligation of good faith, although
the weight of actual authority seems to suggest otherwise.
Whatever the rights or wrongs of this, there can be no
doubt that there are long-standing examples of the
requirement of good faith in insurance law – for example
when the insurer is exercising rights to control litigation
involving its insured and when the insured acts in a way
that might prejudice the insurer’s subrogation rights.
However, in support of my view that these are different
situations, I would refer again to the view of McNair J that
I cited earlier, at the same time pleading with the judges to
choose their language carefully.
Fortunately, although at some expense to the various
parties involved, the courts have resolved the issue I
mentioned a few minutes ago – of whether there is a
continuing duty of disclosure – in a satisfactory manner, in
effect by saying that basically there is no such duty except
when the basic cover is being altered in some way, and
treating the question of fraud in making a claim as a matter
for express provision or governed by general principles of
policy. In this context I would respectfully draw your
attention to the view, expressed extra-judicially, of Lord
Justice Rix, when, in a lecture given a couple of years ago
to the British Insurance Law Association, he referred to a
reawakening of the underlying doctrine of good faith,
which had required that remedies for breach became more
thoughtful, focused, proportionate and flexible. Perhaps
this comment, reflecting on the decisions in The Star Sea,
The Mercandian Continent and The Aegeon, does in fact
recognise that pre-contract utmost good faith is different
from any contractual requirement of continuing good faith
(This comment may perhaps now be seen as
foreshadowing his judgment in Drake Insurance plc v Provident
Insurance plc [2003] EWCA Civ 1834).
Unlike the position in some civilian jurisdictions, where
there is a practice of longer-term insurance policies, we do
not need a general continuing duty of disclosure. If the
insurer wants protection in the context of the standard
year-long indemnity policy, it can expressly provide for it
(although that of course may raise issues about whether
there need to be limits on what can be contractually
provided).
WHAT THEN NEEDS TO BE DONE?
What then are the areas of insurance contract law that
are in particular need of examination by the Law
Commission?
Non-disclosure and misrepresentation
I will refer first to the fundamental questions of non-
disclosure and misrepresentation. I should make it clear
that I have no problem with the concept of initial
disclosure in insurance. The risks have to be properly
assessed. Insurance is different from most other types of
contract, as Lord Mansfield recognised so many years ago.
Recent case law continues to stress this peculiar quality of
insurance. In the words of Lord Justice Mance in the very
recent decision in Brotherton v Aseguradora Colseguros SA (No
2) ([2003] EWCA Civ 705, para 24, [2003] Lloyd’s Rep
IR 746 at 755): “The sound philosophical basis of the duty
of disclosure in an insurance context is that a true and fair
agreement for the transfer of risk on an appropriate basis
depends on equality of information.”
The problem of course is the scope of the duty and the
remedy in the event of a breach. In some respects, as I have
indicated, the law is better than it was 25 years ago, but
there are issues needing to be explored. Despite the
developments in the common law, there can be no doubt
that the Law Commission’s recommendation that a
proposer disclose only what a reasonable person in their
position would disclose would change the law, and when a
proposal form is used lead to the withering away of a pure
duty of disclosure on initial application in virtually all cases.
But there may still be a case for a residual duty on the
proposer, if only to cover the exceptional cases where no
appropriate question is asked or perhaps could reasonably
be asked. A simple example, not dissimilar to ones given by
the Law Commission, is the case of the householder who
applies for insurance knowing that their house has been the
subject of threats of arson.
Under a regime of disclosure according to the view of
the reasonable insured, is there any need to worry about
exactly what the inducement requirement introduced by
Pan Atlantic means exactly? There are arguably issues that
could still be clarified, including the exact nature of that
requirement and the extent to which there is a
presumption of inducement. On the other hand, the
question might arise as to whether that was needed any
longer.
What certainly are ripe for re-examination, I would
suggest, are the remedial consequences of a non-disclosure
or misrepresentation. Should the law formally enact what
became the practice of the Ombudsman and allow
proportionate recovery as an alternative, where
appropriate, to complete avoidance? We have of course
seen recent discussion of whether avoidance can be
restricted by requiring that the insurer itself act in good
faith, which at present is the subject of two conflicting
Court of Appeal decisions (Brotherton and Drake). I always
had some doubts about that development, if only because
it confuses the role of utmost good faith and disclosure
with the broader concept of good faith, and whether
insurers’ remedies can be restricted in this way surely6
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cannot be decided without at least some consideration of
the extent to which such a doctrine does or might apply in
contract law generally. But this does not mean that a law
reform agency should not seriously examine the issue.
Where there is perhaps a real problem is regarding what
to do on renewal. We know that in law a renewal of an
indemnity policy constitutes a new contract and that the
duty of disclosure arises once more. Consumer insureds at
least are warned of this on the notices that insurers send
out inviting renewal. Many of us renew our household and
other policies year upon year with the same insurer. This
does not always require us to take any positive steps. My
home insurer, which is in possession of a direct debit
authority allowing it to collect its premium, sends me
information just before renewal every year that makes it
clear that if I am happy to carry on I need do nothing. My
motor insurer requires me to contact it, but even when I
do that by telephone the questions that I am asked cover a
pretty limited range of information. Of course I am aware
that I need to disclose to them anything that has happened
within the previous year that is material, and I guess that I
have a fairly good idea of what is meant by materiality, but
is everyone in a similar position? I doubt it! Do people
read the warnings that are fairly prominent? Do they
understand them even if they do read them?
I would like here briefly to tell you a story about David
Tench and the approach that he said he adopted when
dealing with his insurers. David was Legal Officer of the
Consumers’ Association for many years including at the
time that the Law Commission Report was being
considered by Government. He was involved when
consumer representatives were called in to Whitehall to
give their views. He had decided that the best policy on
renewal was to tell his insurers everything significant that
had happened to him and his family during the previous
year – a forerunner perhaps of the round robin missives
that many people now have the habit of distributing with
their Christmas cards. I remember him saying, in all
seriousness, that he once told his insurers that his dog had
died. When asked why, he replied that it was well know
that having a dog was a deterrent to burglary and that the
death must therefore be a material fact as it increased the
risk of burglary. I do not imagine that David’s insurer
would ever have dared trying to avoid his contract of
insurance for non-disclosure!
Seriously, though, there are important and difficult
questions here. If the risk has changed the insurer needs to
know. That is only fair to it and its other policyholders. I
think that I would favour a requirement that on renewal
the insured is obliged to sign and return some sort of fairly
straightforward declaration, but I certainly think that it is
an issue that requires detailed examination.
A more general issue in this context concerns the broad
principle of utmost good faith or simply good faith as
currently stated in section 17 of the 1906 Act or whatever
more modern expression might be used to encapsulate it.
Despite the learned views of the House of Lords in The Star
Sea, I remain unconvinced that Chalmers meant to do any
more than provide for an introduction to the specific
disclosure etc requirements. But accepting that there is a
broad principle in current law, the question arises whether
it should be retained as a general principle. Should it made
an implied term of the insurance contract with the
consequence that on breach the innocent party would have
a damages claim? This has been done in Australia and the
National Consumer Council Report of 1997 and the BILA
Report suggested that we should at least look at it. I have
rather mixed feelings here. On the one hand I can see the
attractions of such an all-embracing principle, on the other
I can foresee it being raised in contexts that we can hardly
imagine today, perhaps with adverse consequences. On
balance I am not sure that I am comfortable with such
general statements of principle, but that may be because I
am a common lawyer who looks for a reasonable degree of
certainty!
CO-INSURANCES
Another area which seems to be ripe for detailed
examination is that of co-insurance. Although, as I
indicated earlier, there has been case law clarifying the
position in respect of utmost good faith and the effect of
breaches of warranty or condition and wilful misconduct in
cases where more than one person is insured under the
same policy, there are questions as to whether or not the
correct or the fair result has been reached in all cases. We
should not forget that co-insurance is a remarkably
common phenomenon, whether it involves the spouses
who insure their property together or the insurance jointly
effected by, for example, mortgagor and mortgagee; there
are many other examples that could be given.
The basic position seems to be that if the insurance is
properly joint, that is joint insurance of property jointly
owned, then an innocent co-insured is affected by the
action or inaction of the guilty co-insured. The rationale
for this has been challenged in New Zealand case law (see
for example Maulder v National Insurance Co of New Zealand
[1993] NZLR 351), and there is at least an issue as to
whether or not the principle operates fairly. For example,
is it right that the wholly innocent partner of the co-
insured who burns down their jointly owned house
receives nothing? If it were felt that they should receive
something, how much should that be?
On the other hand, deciding in effect that composite
insurances amount to bundles of separate contracts, as
seems to be the result of decisions like MGN v New
Hampshire and Arab Bank v Zurich, can sometimes also lead
to curious results, certainly in a situation where one co-
insured commits fraud. Of course insurers can protect
themselves to some extent against consequences that they
do not like by drafting, but I am not convinced that this is 7
Amicus Curiae Issue 54 July/August 2004
A
rticle
A
rticle
a complete answer to the question of whether or not the
basic legal position merits reflection.
TERMS AND CONDITIONS
As I have already said, and as I am sure you recall anyway,
the second major aspect of insurance law that the Law
Commission examined was the law of insurance
warranties. Probably the critical recommendations here
were those to abolish the basis of the contract clause,
which may still be found in commercial proposal forms,
and to require a causal link between breach and loss before
a claim could be defeated. It seems almost self-evident that
the law should provide along those lines, and it might help
to avoid some of the contortionist reasoning that the courts
seemingly felt had to be adopted in cases like Printpak v AGF
([1999] Lloyd’s Rep IR 542) and Kler Knitwear v Lombard
([2000] Lloyd’s Rep IR 47), so that the insured was not
prejudiced by what in both cases were breaches of warranty
that were unrelated to the claim. If the reason for the
insurers’ view in those cases was a suspicion of fraud or
some other wrongdoing, then they should have had to
prove it.
However, there are other issues that I would argue
should now be looked at. I was never very happy that the
Law Commission did not go beyond warranties and look at
other terms, especially those that might be called
“conditions” but which serve the same risk controlling
function as warranties. Their rather cavalier statement that
if insurers tried to evade a new warranty law by using other
means, someone would step in and regulate them seemed
to me over-optimistic at the time. In this context it would
be worthwhile to examine the impact of applying the
innominate term concept to insurance.
Another issue would be the relationship between
insurance terms and the Unfair Terms Regulations. Let me
hasten to say here that I have no problem with the concept
of a warranty as a device that limits the risk to which the
insurer is subject. If an insured clearly knows that they
should have a properly working security system, for
example, then I have no sympathy with them if they have
not and suffer a causally-related loss. So I would not wish
warranties and other terms of that sort to be open to
assessment on the basis of fairness, as opposed to
intelligibility, not indeed do I think that they in fact are.
But others think differently and this is clearly therefore a
matter that deserves further consideration.
INSURER’S FAILURE TO PAY
There is one other substantive issue that I want to
discuss. In a sense it is unrelated to those I have already
mentioned, which all in some way or another affect the risk
that the insurer is subject to under the contract, but in
another sense it is related because it raises the issue of the
good faith of the insurer. This is good faith in its general
sense, not its peculiar insurance sense. I refer here to the
lack of an effective remedy for the insured when the
insurer for no good reason delays unduly in settling a claim.
You will recall the decision in Sprung v Royal Insurance (UK)
Ltd ([1997] CLC 70) and the earlier authorities that rule
out a damages remedy for somewhat arcane and obscure
reasons (contrast the approach of the Canadian Supreme
Court in Whiten v Pilot Insurance Company 2002 SCC 18).
This could be of course be dealt with by a general
statutory obligation on the insurer as well as the insured to
act in good faith, but at the very least it needs examination
on its own. But we should also note that there might be a
statutory remedy under section 150 of the Financial
Services and Markets Act 2000 when the FSA Code on
general insurance selling comes into force.
OTHER ISSUES
In the items I have outlined above, I have tried to
identify what I think are the key issues for insurance law
reform. There are others that I will not consider in detail,
for example issues of agency (the notorious rule in
Newsholme Bros v Road Transport & General Ins Co ([1929] 2
KB 356)) and of subrogation that were considered in the
National Consumer Council Report. And I am sure that
other people would think of yet more (For example the
meaning of insurable interest, especially following the
Court of Appeal decision in Feasey v Sun Life Assurance Co of
Canada [2003] EWCA Civ 885, [2003] Lloyd’s Rep IR
637). This seems to indicate to me that any reference to
the Law Commission should, at least initially, be a fairly
open-ended one.
To whom would this all apply?
I have already said that the Law Commission was
adamant that their proposals should apply across the
board, with the exception only of marine, aviation and
transport insurance. In retrospect this looked like a
mistake, and there is an argument that any reform should
only apply to individual consumers and small businesses
(those perhaps within the jurisdiction of the Financial
Ombudsman Scheme), on the ground that bigger
businesses can protect themselves with professional advice.
On the other hand, as I have said I am pretty sure that the
distinguished judges calling for reform did not confine
their remarks in this way. My own view is a pragmatic one
at this stage. If a limited reform is much more likely to be
acceptable, then I would go for that on the grounds that it
is better than nothing.
CONCLUSION
I hope that what I have said has at the very least
stimulated you to think further. I am conscious that I have
probably raised more questions than given firm answers,
but that is because I am not sure that I know all the
answers. I do think that we would all benefit from a
modern insurance code concerning the most fundamental8
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aspects of insurance contract law. But we must be wary that
any reform does not provide a means for insurers to
introduce terms and conditions “by the back door”.
Whatever the outcome might be, I would like to add my
voice to the more authoritative ones asking for the
Government to show good faith by agreeing to a review of
insurance contract law.
I should add that I do not think that most of the various
proposals for reform that have been made over the past 25
years are anti-insurance. There may be some who would
say that insurers should pay up every time, but I am not
one of those. I think that there is a perception problem,
though, and that a common feeling is that “they have taken
my money, so now I want some of it back”. There is a
“story” that I have come across (at http://www.insurance.
lt/index.php/en/12509/) that quite nicely illustrates what
seems to be this perception. Bear in mind that it is from
the USA.
“Mr John Mumford III was a rich old man dying from a rare
disease. On his deathbed, he called for his insurance agent,
doctor and preacher: “I trusted each of you my entire life.
Now I want to give each of you $30,000 cash in an
envelope to put in my grave. I want to take it with me.” At
the funeral, each one placed their envelope on top of the man,
then he was laid to rest. On the way back from the funeral,
in the limo, the doctor confessed, “I must tell you gentlemen,
I only put $20,000 on top of Mr Mumford. I wanted to buy
this new machine that would enable me to diagnose the rare
disease he had and save others. It’s what he would have
wanted”. Then the preacher said: “I have to confess too. I
only put $10,000 on top of Mr Mumford. We needed that
money to help more homeless, and it’s also what Mr Mumford
would have wanted”. The insurance agent was angry with
both the men, and said: “I can’t believe both of you, stealing
from a dead man. I wrote Mr Mumford a cheque for the full
$30,000!”
It seems to me that a balanced reform that changes the
law, but not really the practice, of insurance could be
effected in a way that presented the industry in a better
light than this.
9
Amicus Curiae Issue 54 July/August 2004
A
rticle
Professor John Birds
University of Sheffield
